Worldwide there are substantial differences within and between countries in aggression and violence. Although there are various exceptions, a general rule is that aggression and violence increase as one moves closer to the equator, which suggests the important role of climate differences. While this pattern is robust, theoretical explanations for these large differences in aggression and violence within countries and around the world are lacking. Most extant explanations focus on the influence of average temperature as a factor that triggers aggression, (...) or the notion that warm temperature allows for more social interaction situations in which aggression is likely to unfold. We propose a new model, CLimate, Aggression, and Self-control in Humans, that helps us to understand differences within and between countries in aggression and violence in terms of differences in climate. Lower temperatures, and especially larger degrees of seasonal variation in climate, call for individuals and groups to adopt a slower life history strategy, a greater focus on the future, and a stronger focus on self-control. The CLASH model further outlines that slow life strategy, future orientation, and strong self-control are important determinants of inhibiting aggression and violence. We also discuss how CLASH differs from other recently developed models that emphasize climate differences for understanding conflict. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and societal importance of climate in shaping individual and societal differences in aggression and violence. (shrink)

The current assessment of behaviors in the inventories to diagnose autism spectrum disorders (ASD) focus on observation and discrete categorizations. Behaviors require movements, yet measurements of physical movements are seldom included. Their inclusion however, could provide an objective characterization of behavior to help unveil interactions between the peripheral and the central nervous systems. Such interactions are critical for the development and maintenance of spontaneous autonomy, self-regulation and voluntary control. At present, current approaches cannot deal with the heterogeneous, dynamic and stochastic (...) nature of development. Accordingly, they leave no avenues for real-time or longitudinal assessments of change in a coping system continuously adapting and developing compensatory mechanisms. We offer a new unifying statistical framework to reveal re-afferent kinesthetic features of the individual with ASD. The new methodology is based on the non-stationary stochastic patterns of minute fluctuations (micro-movements) inherent to our natural actions. Such patterns of behavioral variability provide re-entrant sensory feedback contributing to the autonomous regulation and coordination of the motor output. From an early age, this feedback supports centrally driven volitional control and fluid, flexible transitions between intentional and spontaneous behaviors. We show that in ASD there is a disruption in the maturation of this form of proprioception. Despite this disturbance, each individual has unique adaptive compensatory capabilities that we can unveil and exploit to evoke faster and more accurate decisions. Measuring the kinesthetic re-afference in tandem with stimuli variations we can detect changes in their micro-movements indicative of a more predictive and reliable kinesthetic percept. Our methods address the heterogeneity of ASD with a personalized approach grounded in the inherent sensory-motor abilities that the individual has already developed. (shrink)

What does it mean to be an aesthetic beholder? Is it different than simply being a perceiver? Most theories of aesthetic perception focus on 1) features of the perceived object and its presentation or 2) on psychological evaluative or emotional responses and intentions of perceiver and artist. In this chapter I propose that we need to look at the process of engaged perception itself, and further that this temporal process of be- coming a beholder must be understood in its embodied, (...) contextual and dynamic speci- ficity. Through both phenomenological and neuroscientific explorations I analyze what is characteristic about a more “aesthetic stance” and argue that there is a certain asym- metry between beholder and beheld, which has to do with a disengagement of goal- directed action, and which allows for other kinds of perceptual involvement than in a more “practical stance”. It is a multi-disciplinary project integrating a sensorimotor no- tion of aesthetic affordances, 18th century philosophy, and large-scale brain network findings. What ensues is a new dynamic framework for future empirical and theoretical research on aesthetic perception. (shrink)

No two individuals with the autism diagnosis are ever the same—yet many practitioners and parents can recognize signs of ASD very rapidly with the naked eye. What, then, is this phenotype of autism that shows itself across such distinct clinical presentations and heterogeneous developments? The “signs” seem notoriously slippery and resistant to the behavioral threshold categories that make up current assessment tools. Part of the problem is that cognitive and behavioral “abilities” typically are theorized as high-level disembodied and modular functions—that (...) are assessed discretely (impaired, normal, enhanced) to define a spectral syndrome. Even as biology reminds us that organic developing bodies are not made up of independent switches, we remain often seduced by the simplicity of mechanistic and cognitive models. Developmental disorders such as autism have accordingly been theorized as due to different modular dysfunctions—typically of cortical origin, i.e., failures of “theory of mind” (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), of the “mirror neuron system” (Ramachandran and Oberman, 2006), of “weak central coherence” (Happe and Frith, 2006) or of the balance of “empathizing” and “systemizing” (Baron-Cohen, 2009), just to list a few. -/- The broad array of autonomic (Ming et al., 2005; Cheshire, 2012) and sensorimotor (Damasio and Maurer, 1978; Maurer and Damasio, 1982; Donnellan and Leary, 1995; Leary and Hill, 1996; Donnellan and Leary, 2012; Donnellan et al., 2012) differences experienced and reported by people with autism have by such theories typically been sidelined as “co-morbidities,” possibly sharing genetic causes, but rendered as incidental and decisively behaviorally irrelevant symptoms—surely disconnected from cognition. But what if the development of cortically based mental processes and autonomous control relies on the complexities and proper function of the peripheral nervous systems? Through such an “embodied” lens the heterogeneous symptoms of autism invites new interpretations. We propose here that many behavioral-level findings can be re-defined as downstream effects of how developing nervous systems attempt to cope and adapt to the challenges of having various noisy, unpredictable, and unreliable peripheral inputs. (shrink)

What is it about relativism that justifies, or at least explains, its continued appeal in the face of relentless attacks through the history of philosophy? This paper explores a new answer to this old question, casting the response in metaphilosophical terms. § i introduces the problem. § ii argues that one part of the answer is that some of the well-known defences of relativism take it to be a philosophical stance—that is, a broad perspective or orientation with normative consequences—rather than (...) a doctrine or a thesis. § iii draws attention to an assumption, not always explicitly stated by its proponents, that the relativist stance leads to the cultivation of some key intellectual virtues. Open-mindedness, tolerance, intellectual humility, and curiosity are examples of the intellectual virtues that relativism can foster. § iv argues that the defence of relativism on the basis of the virtues that are assumed to follow from it, at best, is only partially successful. Moreover, there is a range of epistemic vices, resulting from the stance, that undercuts the virtue-based defence presented in § iii. (shrink)

Largely aided by the neurological discovery of so-called “ mirror neurons,” the attention to motor activity during action observation has exploded over the last two decades. The idea that we internally “ mirror ” the actions of others has led to a new strand of implicit simulation theories of action understanding[1][2]. The basic idea of this sort of simulation theory is that we, via an automatic covert activation of our own action representations, can understand the action and possibly the goal (...) and/or intentions of the observed agent. In this way motor “simulation” is seen as the basis for low-level “mind-reading”; i.e. for the ascription of goals and intentional mental states to others. The thought is that one, through mirroring simulations, can get beyond the observable behaviour to the hidden minds of others. I am questioning the idea of an exclusively “mirroring” role of the motor system in social perception, which is tacitly assumed in this sort of simulation theories. Is motor activity during action observation really primarily a simulation, a detailed “echo” of the others action? My point is not that we never simulate what we observe, but rather to question whether such processes are representative of the overall motor contribution to social cognition. More and more studies on the functional properties of mirror neurons and motor facilitation during perception points to a more complex role of the motor system in action perception. Recently, several proposals have been made attempting to reinterpret and critique the function of motor activity in social situations. I shall here briefly touch on a few of these and sketch parts of my own alternative “social affordance” hypothesis of the sensorimotor contribution to social perception. By way of these analyses I highlight how traditional discussions are marred by problematic theoretical assumptions. It seems to me that we need a thorough reinterpretation not just of mirror neurons and mirroring, but also of what we take motor and social cognition to be. In my view the details of the sensorimotor findings underline the need to move beyond the simplistic idea of the motor system as a unitary output system. In terms of social cognition I question the traditional focus on hidden mental states. I suggest that the motor contribution might have more to do with understanding the process of how others choose their actions, navigate the world and relate to others than with simulating specific actual actions or mental states. I conclude that low-level simulation theories, which see the motor role in social perception as passive “mirroring,” are faced with serious empirical challenges, and that the motor system serve a much more proactive and complex cognitive role in social perception and interaction than previously thought. But my claim is also that many empirical tensions have slipped out of focus due to entrenched theoretical assumptions. Narrow theoretical expectations have marked not only the interpretations but the research itself and I propose that we are in dire need of more studies of actual contextual and interactive social perception. (shrink)

Autism has been defined as a disorder of social cognition, interaction and communication where ritualistic, repetitive behaviors are commonly observed. But how should we understand the behavioral and cognitive differences that have been the main focus of so much autism research? Can high-level cognitive processes and behaviors be identified as the core issues people with autism face, or do these characteristics perhaps often rather reflect individual attempts to cope with underlying physiological issues? Much research presented in this volume will point (...) to the latter possibility, i.e. that people on the autism spectrum cope with issues at much lower physiological levels pertaining not only to Central Nervous Systems (CNS) function, but also to peripheral and autonomic systems (PNS, ANS) (Torres, Brincker, et al. 2013). The question that we pursue in this chapter is what might be fruitful ways of gaining objective measures of the large-scale systemic and heterogeneous effects of early atypical neurodevelopment; how to track their evolution over time and how to identify critical changes along the continuum of human development and aging. We suggest that the study of movement variability—very broadly conceived as including all minute fluctuations in bodily rhythms and their rates of change over time (coined micro-movements (Figure 1A-B) (Torres, Brincker, et al. 2013))—offers a uniquely valuable and entirely objectively quantifiable lens to better assess, understand and track not only autism but cognitive development and degeneration in general. This chapter presents the rationale firstly behind this focus on micro-movements and secondly behind the choice of specific kinds of data collection and statistical metrics as tools of analysis (Figure 1C). In brief the proposal is that the micro-movements (defined in Part I – Chapter 1), obtained using various time scales applied to different physiological data-types (Figure 1), contain information about layered influences and temporal adaptations, transformations and integrations across anatomically semi-independent subsystems that crosstalk and interact. Further, the notion of sensorimotor re-afference is used to highlight the fact that these layered micro-motions are sensed and that this sensory feedback plays a crucial role in the generation and control of movements in the first place. In other words, the measurements of various motoric and rhythmic variations provide an access point not only to the “motor systems”, but also access to much broader central and peripheral sensorimotor and regulatory systems. Lastly, we posit that this new lens can also be used to capture influences from systems of multiple entry points or collaborative control and regulation, such as those that emerge during dyadic social interactions. (shrink)

Motor learning can be defined as a process that leads to relatively permanent changes in motor behavior through repeated interactions with the environment. Different strategies can be adopted to achieve motor learning: movements can be overtly practiced leading to an amelioration of motor performance; alternatively, covert strategies (e.g., action observation) can promote neuroplastic changes in the motor system even in the absence of real movement execution. However, whether a training regularly alternating action observation and execution (i.e., Action Observation Training, AOT) (...) may surpass the pure motor practice (MP) and observational learning (OL) remains to be established. To address this issue, we enrolled 54 subjects requiring them to learn tying nautical knots via one out of three types of training (AOT, MP, OL) with the scope to investigate which element mostly contributes to motor learning. We evaluated the overall improvement of each group, along with the predictive role that neuropsychological indexes exert on each treatment outcome. The AOT group exhibited the highest performance improvement (42%), indicating that the regular alternation between observation and execution biases participants toward a better performance. The reiteration of this sequence provides an incremental, adjunct value that super-adds onto the efficacy of motor practice or observational learning in isolation (42% > 25% + 10%, i.e., OL + MP). These findings extend the use of the AOT from clinical and rehabilitative contexts to daily routines requiring the learning and perfectioning of new motor skills such as sports training, music, and occupational activities requiring fine motor control. (shrink)

Over the last four decades arguments for and against the claim that creative hypothesis formation is based on Darwinian ‘blind’ variation have been put forward. This paper offers a new and systematic route through this long-lasting debate. It distinguishes between undirected, random, and unjustified variation, to prevent widespread confusions regarding the meaning of undirected variation. These misunderstandings concern Lamarckism, equiprobability, developmental constraints, and creative hypothesis formation. The paper then introduces and develops the standard critique that creative hypothesis formation is guided (...) rather than blind, integrating developments from contemporary research on creativity. On that basis, I discuss three compatibility arguments that have been used to answer the critique. These arguments do not deny guided variation but insist that an important analogy exists nonetheless. These compatibility arguments all fail, even though they do so for different reasons: trivialisation, conceptual confusion, and lack of evidence respectively. Revisiting the debate in this manner not only allows us to see where exactly a ‘Darwinian’ account of creative hypothesis formation goes wrong, but also to see that the debate is not about factual issues, but about the interpretation of these factual issues in Darwinian terms. (shrink)

In this chapter what I call the “backside” of habit is explored. I am interested in the philosophical implications of the physical and physiological processes that mediate, and which allow for what comes to appear as almost magic; namely the various sensorimotor associations and integrations that allows us to replay our past experiences, and to in a certain sense perceive potential futures, and to act and bring about anticipated outcomes – without quite knowing how. Thus, the term “backside” is meant (...) to refer both the actual mediation and the epistemic opacity of these backstage intermediaries that allow for the front stage magic. The question is if the epistemic complexities around sensorimotor mediation gives us valuable insights into the nature of human agency and further how it might begin to show us new ways to think of the mind as truly embodied yet not reducible to any finite body-as-object. (shrink)

This article draws on insights of young people learning to make natural pigments and traditional paintings in acute climate vulnerable areas. Why do they paint during ongoing crises and how do they voice their future concerns? Critical realism is applied as a meta-theory in this field-based study in a slum area in Kolkata and the Sundarbans mangrove forest. Methods comprise focus groups, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation. Analysis was done in an abductive process, applying Roy Bhaskar’s model of ‘four-planar social (...) being’. The analysis demonstrates how painting with natural pigments leads the young ones towards: (a) discovering beauty in nature (b) transcendence of borders (c) transformation and responsible action (d) discovering one’s own dignity. Findings are discussed considering the key concepts co-presence and crisis system. I reflect upon how this local effort can inspire a new economy, with the signposts: becoming co-present with the natural world and the necessity of beauty. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline a grammar of lifting (i.e., resistance training) and compare it to that of language. I approach lifting as a system of generating complex meaning–form correspondences from regularized elements and describe the levels of mental representations and relationships between them that are involved in full command of this system. To be able to do so, I adopt a goal-based conception of meaning, which allows us to talk about mappings from complex goals to complex surface outputs in (...) systems of intentional action, signaling and non-signaling, interactive and non-interactive, in a unified way, and show how it applies in lifting. I then proceed to argue that the grammar of lifting is architecturally very similar to that of language. First, I show that both involve stable (idiomatized/lexicalized) pairings of regularized forms with regularized meanings. Second, I argue that in both lifting and language, meaning–form mapping is mediated by syntax, which, crucially, operates on non-linearized hierarchical structures of abstract objects that include both content morphemes and functional morphemes. I conclude, following and expanding on some insights from prior literature and offering further evidence for them, that neither of these architectural phenomena (idiomatized meaning–form pairings and abstract syntax) is specific to language, with both of them likely emerging in skilled action that does not necessarily involve social interaction, due to considerations of repeatability and reusability of elements in new contexts. (shrink)

The New Economic Windows Series, derived from Massimo Salzano's ideas and work, incorporates material from textbooks, monographs and conference proceedings that deals with both the theoretical and applied aspects of various sub-disciplines ...

The article aims to show that compatibilism can be defended against Pereboom’s ‘Four Case’ Manipulation Argument, hereinafter referred to as 4-Case MA, by combining the soft-line and the hard-line replies. In the first section, I argue that the original version of the 4-Case MA was refuted by the soft-line reply, but Pereboom’s modified version of the argument can’t be refuted this way. In the second section, I analyse McKenna’s hard-line reply to the original Pereboom’s 4-Case MA and argue that it (...) wasn’t completely successful. In section three, I present five new Pereboom-style cases. In section four, I argue that these new cases constitute a combination of the soft-line and hard-line defence against Pereboom’s modified multiple case manipulation argument. (shrink)

The synthetic theory of evolution has gone stale and an expanding or (re-)widening of it towards a new synthesis has been announced. This time, development and culture are supposed to join the synthesis bandwagon. In this article, I distinguish between four kinds of synthesis that are involved when we extend the evolutionary synthesis towards culture: the integration of fields, the heuristic generation of interfields, the expansion of validity, and the creation of a common frame of discourse or ‘big-picture’. These kinds (...) of synthesis are connected to epistemic values that are used to evaluate theories as well as analogies. A review of these epistemic values and the kinds of synthesis connected to them shall illustrate two points. First, that the discussions about culture and evolution exhibit an epistemic bias towards synthesis, even if, as history shows, synthesis and well as isolation can be fruitful epistemic strategies in science. The paper thus contains some critical notes on the value of synthesis in science. Second, reviewing the kinds of synthesis and values involved allows for a new perspective on the analogies involved in theories of cultural evolution. It is a perspective that makes the criteria with which these theories are usually evaluated explicit. With this we can compare the different standpoints people have taken on the usefulness of theories of cultural evolution at a higher level. Differences arise because of different epistemic values assumed. (shrink)

Recent authors have drawn attention to a new kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as higher-order evidence. Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one’s doxastic state is the result of a flawed process – for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug. I argue that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle. The puzzle is that at least in some situations involving higher-order defeaters (...) the correct epistemic rules issue conflicting recommendations. For instance, a subject ought to believe p, but she ought also to suspend judgment in p. I discuss three responses. The first resists the puzzle by arguing that there is only one correct epistemic rule, an Über-rule. The second accepts that there are genuine epistemic dilemmas. The third appeals to a hierarchy or ordering of correct epistemic rules. I spell out problems for all of these responses. I conclude that the right lesson to draw from the puzzle is that a state can be epistemically rational or justified even if one has what looks to be strong evidence to think that it is not. As such, the considerations put forth constitute a non question-begging argument for a kind of externalism. (shrink)

Dal "disegno su sabbia" delle donne australiane alle terrecotte delle donne del Camerun, dai retablos peruviani agli altari vodou degli immigrati haitiani a New York, dalla "Casa del popolo" del regno di Bandjoun alle "vetrinette" italiane degli anni Sessanta, dai malanggan e dai manufatti annodati dell'Oceania alla topologia dei nodi, dai bologan del Mali alla "Potlatch Collection" rimpatriata nei nuovi musei indigeni del Canada, dalle maschere gelede degli Yoruba alla figura ubiqua e mediatica di Mami Wata, i saggi di questo (...) volume evidenziano le valenze operative dell'arte: sia nell'arena sociale e politica contemporanea, cui appartengono anche le "tradizioni", sia nel campo cognitivo e religioso. A lungo confinata ai soli territori esotici delle culture "primitive" e limitata da un'eccessiva dipendenza dalle categorie interpretative occidentali, la riflessione antropologica sull'arte e sull'estetica trova oggi un nuovo respiro teorico, e un nuovo fascino. (shrink)

This paper explores the question of Leibniz’s contribution to the rise of modern ‘science’. To be sure, it is now generally agreed that the modern category of ‘science’ did not exist in the early modern period. At the same time, this period witnessed a very important stage in the process from which modern science eventually emerged. My discussion will be aimed at uncovering the new enterprise, and the new distinctions which were taking shape in the early modern period under the (...) banner of the old Aristotelian terminology. I will argue that Leibniz begins to theorize a distinction between physics and metaphysics that tracks our distinction between the autonomous enterprise of science in its modern meaning, and the enterprise of philosophy. I will try to show that, for Leibniz, physics proper is the study of natural phenomena in mathematical and mechanical terms without recourse for its explanations to metaphysical notions. This autonomy, however, does not imply for Leibniz that physics can say on its own all that there is to be said about the natural world. Quite the opposite. Leibniz inherits from the Aristotelian tradition the view that physics needs metaphysical roots or a metaphysical grounding. For Leibniz, what is ultimately real is reached by metaphysics, not by physics. This is, in my view, Leibniz’s chief insight: the new mathematical physics is an autonomous enterprise which offers its own kind of explanations but does not exhaust what can (and should) be said about the natural world. (shrink)

Numa época em que as transformações económicas, políticas e sociais têm vindo a criar à física (e às ciências em geral) um novo contexto de investigação, procuro dar conta do modo como estes novos desafios, que se estendem ao domínio filosófico e cultural, estão a ser encarados pelos cientistas. Num momento em que a "ciência de investigação" ("académica", "normal") sofre uma retracção face à expansão duma ciência "pós-normal", "pós-académica", e em que, ao lado da clivagem entre as "duas" culturas (científica (...) e humanística) uma "terceira", de face tecnológica se vai impondo, aponta-se o risco da concepção duma física "imune" à mudança cultural. /// I attempt to show how scientists are dealing with some new challenges coming from both the philosophical and the cultural domains, in the new context of research that is being created to physics (and indeed to sciences in general) by economical, political and social changes. Now that "research science" (" academic", "normal") becomes less important than a "post-normal", "postacademic" one, and in a time that besides the distinction between the "two" cultures (scientific and humanistic) a "third" one of technological nature is being generally accepted, the danger is shown of conceiving physics as "immune" to cultural change. (shrink)

The extremely rapid evolution of portable technologies and children's receptiveness to constantly accessing the latest information creates the conditions for a number of new developments in most areas of activity. Moreover, their attraction to real-time visualisation of various events and competitions projects a certain level of perception and imitation of certain behaviours. Therefore, special attention should be paid to them from the earliest stages, i.e., from the time they are selected to play various sports. Also, the complementarity of some sports (...) must be taken into account when it is desired to obtain positive results. Age group adaptation and the investigation of some of the parameters relevant to different age groups have generated values that can support positive outcomes in the long term and thus increase motivation to participate in sport at a competitive level. (shrink)

The German-Jewish writer and poetess, Rose Ausländer, who came from Chernivtsi, capital of Bukovina, one of the former provinces of the Hapsburg Empire, is one of the most highly acclaimed lyric poets to have written in German in the 20th century. Throughout her whole life she was an adherent of the philosophy of Spinoza, first becoming acquainted with it in the so-called “ethics seminar” of the secondary-school teacher Friedrich Kettner. In the wake of the First World War the youth of (...) Chernivtsi were in need of new sources of intellectual stimulation, so he set out to introduce them to the philosophy of Spinoza, as well as to that of Constantin Brunner, a contemporary German philosopher influenced by him. Rose Ausländer remained a follower of Spinoza right up to the end of her life. This is confirmed by her two very different poems of the same name, “Spinoza”—the first composed before 1939, the second in 1979—as well as by her many explorations of topics drawn from his ethics, ranging from her very first printed poem, “Amor Dei,” up to her lyrics written in old age, in the 1970s and 1980s. In this short paper I will attempt to chart the course of, and analyze, her interest in Spinoza's philosophical system and life. (shrink)

I propose that Mandarin ｡-sentences (units marked by ｡) are aspectual topic-comment sequences, where an initial update (terminating in a pause) introduces a topic state for comment by one or more clauses. Each comment anaphorically refers to the topic state via the aspect feature of the verbal predicate. This proposal explains why Mandarin ｡-sentences have controversial boundaries, since speakers may disagree where one topic state ends and the next one begins. It also explains various manifestations of aspect-prominence and topic-prominence in (...) Mandarin discourse. In Bittner (2014), this proposal is formally implemented in Categorial Grammar and a new dynamic logic called Update with Centering. (shrink)

At the time of its introduction in the end of the 1980s, the concept of natural capital represented new, more ecologically aware thinking in economics. As a symbol of novel thinking, the metaphor of natural capital stimulated a debate between different disciplinary traditions on the definitions of the concept and research priorities and methods. The concept became a means to control the discourse of sustainable development. In this paper, I focus on the power/ knowledge implications of the use of the (...) concept, and I follow the career of the concept of natural capital in ecological economic publications between the years 1988 and 2000. The main interests are in the use of the concept to affect the rules according to which claims concerning sustainable development can be made and in the constitution of objects of environmental knowledge. (shrink)

Drug-trafficking in Colombia has been a widely researched phenomenon, especially now, as the country undergoes a transition process with its older guerrilla. Now more than ever it is fundamental to examine how drug-trafficking organizations violent activities affect the consolidation of peace. This article considers different approaches to study violence derived from drug-trafficking, in order to advance towards the objectives of transitional justice. For that matter, this work is based on the idea that drug-trafficking directly generates and reproduces violence which is (...) fueled by the structural violence present in the Colombian context. My thesis is that this phenomenon deters non-repetition guarantees and weakens democracy, which is why there will be three main arguments presented that will revolve around the lack of consensus and the implications of considering drug wars as civil wars, how decisions related to the conceptual apprehension limit the competence of international humanitarian law, and the need for holistic strategies capable of facing drug-trafficking’s political and violent power. Later, alternatives will be explored around the possibilities that each argument offers, as well as which aspects could contribute to a more appropriate approach to combat drug-trafficking. Lastly, I will defend why implementing bottom-up oriented actions can advance towards transitional justice’s intermediate and final objectives, as it is the only alternative that escapes fatalist, utopian or interventionist scenarios. (shrink)

_History of knowledge, history of ideas, and other forms of history: An overview in Scandinavian perspective_ This article is an overview in which we paint a picture of the research field that during the 2010s has emerged under the banner of history of knowledge. The purpose is to complement the preface of this special issue, and so give a better context for the issue, by providing a somewhat broader introduction. History of knowledge is here specifically related to history of science (...) and history of ideas. In the first half of the text, we present the emergence of the field and some of its key concepts and perspectives, as well as some critique it has faced. In the second half, we discuss and compare history of knowledge with the institutionalised disciplines of history of ideas in Scandinavia. We see some clear overlaps and similarities between history of ideas and history of knowledge, but also differences. For instance, historians of ideas study traditions of thought, which not necessarily count as knowledge. One point we see with history of knowledge as a field is how it works as an interdisciplinary and integrative meeting point, where historical researchers from different disciplines can gather to discuss the appearance and social function of knowledge, and by doing this have the possibility of also generating new perspectives on cultural and societal history. (shrink)

It is common orthodoxy among internalists and externalists alike that knowledge is lost or defeated in situations involving misleading evidence of a suitable kind. But making sense of defeat has seemed to present a particular challenge for those who reject an internalist justification condition on knowledge. My main aim here is to argue that externalists ought to take seriously a view on which knowledge can be retained even in the face of strong seemingly defeating evidence. As an instructive example, I (...) first discuss whether a theory on which knowledge is belief that is safe from error has the resources for accommodating defeat. I argue that beliefs retained in defeat cases need not be unsafe or true in some accidental way. I then discuss externalist strategies for explaining why we have incorrect intuitions about defeat. The notion of an epistemically reasonable subject plays a central role in my theory. Reasonable subjects adopt general strategies that are good for acquiring true belief and knowledge across a wide range of normal cases, but stubbornly retaining belief in the face of new evidence does not reflect such policies. I argue that though the methods employed by subjects who fail to adjust their beliefs in defeat cases may be perfectly good, they are not good methods to adopt, as their adoption is accompanied by bad dispositions. What emerges is a view on which a subject can know despite being unreasonable, and despite failing to manifest dispositions to know across normal cases. Unreasonable subjects are genuinely criticisable, but like almost anything, knowledge can sometimes be achieved in the absence of a good general strategy. (shrink)

In the 1980s, new reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertilisation and embryo transfer became commercially available in the United States, and somatic cell nuclear transfer—the cloning process by which Dolly the Sheep would be conceived in 1996—was in its experimental phase. While anxieties concerning these new technologies escalated in the popular sensorium, Laurie Anderson explored the phenomenon of cloning in a short musical film called What You Mean We? (1986) in which Anderson consults a design team to clone herself (...) in order to manage her demanding workload. The videographic image of the clone is Anderson herself, performing in drag, and her clone’s body is partially created through the use of a pitch shifter which changes Anderson’s voice to that of the cloned—but ostensibly male—version of herself. In this article, I investigate Anderson’s technological consideration of the body, which extends beyond her own corporeality, to interrogate the biological and affective capacities of clones. I consider how Anderson addresses the convergence of reproductive technologies, the market and the creation of subjects within this market as participating in a shift in how voices are heard, governed and reproduced in the latter half of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Over the last several decades an increasing number of philosophers have announced their sympathies for or have become affiliated with what has become known as neo-pragmatism. The connection between the various strands of pragmatism, new and old, however, remains quite unclear. This paper attempts to shed some light on this issue by focusing on a debate between Hilary Putnam and Robert Brandom on classical and contemporary pragmatisms. Using the Brandom-Putnam debate as my starting point, I examine the relationship between the (...) pragmatisms of Putnam and Rorty, two of the most influential neopragmatists, and argue that differing conceptions of the normative are at the heart of their disagreement. I further argue that this disagreement has similarities to, and can be illuminated by, two differing conceptions of norms in Wittgenstein's work. I conclude that Brandom does not delineate the differences between various strands of pragmatism convincingly. (shrink)

Amele (Papuan, New Guinea) is a tense-mood-based language (in the typology of Bittner 2014) with an elaborate system of clause chaining, including switch reference (SR) and serial verb constructions (SVC). This draft analyzes two interlinear Amele texts (from Roberts 2007) in Update with Centering of Bittner (2014). The basic idea is that an SR-chain is a topic-comment sequence about a 'topical development' — i.e. a topic time framing a chain of causally linked events. In contrast, an SVC is a chain (...) of verbs that jointly introduce a single eventuality into discourse. (shrink)

The general topic of this paper is the ontological commitment to so-called "fictitious objects", that is, things and characters of fictional stories, like Sherlock Holmes and Pegasus. Discourse about fiction seems to entail an ontological commitment to fictitious entities, a commitment that is often deemed inconsistent with empirical facts. For instance, "Pegasus is a flying horse" seems to entail "There are flying horses" as well as "Pegasus exists" (according to some widely accepted logical principles). I discuss two solutions that have (...) been proposed in the literature. The first one amounts to rejecting sentences like "Pegasus is a flying horse" as false, at least if they are taken at face value. This solution is called the "story operator strategy". It consists in paraphrasing sentences like "Pegasus is a flying horse" by means of the expression "according to a story" such that they are interpreted as an elliptic formulation of, e.g., "According to a story, Pegasus is a flying horse". I spell out the difficulties of the story operator strategy and opt for a realist ontology of fiction. A novel interpretation of the story operator "according to a story" is given, which is not only consistent with but even sheds new light on such a realist ontology. In particular, it is shown how the story operator can be used as a tool to introduce the so-called "modes of predication distinction" (which is an essential ingredient of many realist ontologies of fiction) in a commonsensical way. (shrink)

Tuesday evening, December 27, 1983 …I did go skiing today, though, which is what I want to write about. The temperature is down to –10°C again, on my thermometer, which probably means –12 to –13°C, in real terms. The visibility is still very poor though the wind has stopped. I set off at 2 pm and got home at about 4 pm, which meant skiing in the dark all the time. This wouldn’t have bothered me except that I had an (...) unpleasant adventure in Torssukataq fiord, on the intended route for me New Year’s hike. No more and no less but one of my ski poles went through the ice. I am not sure whether it would have continued all the way down, but it went in deeper than I liked, and I heard and saw water coming up around where it had gone in. I didn’t feel like probing any further, especially in the dark, [so I] just turned in my tracks and, carefully testing the ice with my ski poles, went back as fast as I could. (shrink)

The dissertation criticizes two analogical applications of Darwinism to the spheres of mind and culture: the Darwinian approach to creativity and memetics. These theories rely on three basic analogies: the ontological analogy states that the basic ontological units of culture are so-called memes, which are replicators like genes; the origination analogy states that novelty in human creativity emerges in a "blind" Darwinian manner; and the explanatory units of selection analogy states that memes are "egoistic" and that they can spread independently (...) of our mind. The detailed philosophical analysis offered in the dissertation shows that these three analogies rely on either wrong or trivial statements: they provide either wrong or no new descriptions or explanations of the phenomena at hand. In Chapter One, I introduce the diverse ways, in which contemporary Darwinism is used today outside of evolutionary biology. Chapter Two explains what it means to claim that something evolves in a Darwinian manner. Chapter Three to Five address each of the three analogies separately. Darwinism applied to culture and mind, at least in the way discussed in this study, is not a dangerous idea. It leads either to wrong claims or to a re-telling in Darwinian terms of what we have already known. (shrink)

Traditional theories of autonomy argue for rational agents who are free to make decisions about the moral law and justice. Adopting these theories entails that children lack of autonomy; they are not fully developed rational agents, and, because of that, they are unable to engage in the complex cognitive capacities required by autonomy, such as critical self-reflection or substantive independence. Amy Mullin who, as part of a new area of philosophy called Philosophy of Childhood, argues for granting children minimal or (...) local autonomy. She argues that children's attachments to those they love can be a source of autonomy in a minimal sense. She claims that it is in the relationship with those the child loves that the child is able to find meaningful activities and is able to care for someone or something. I argue that Jeff Lemire’s Essex County Vol. 1 Tales from the Farm, is a depiction of childhood that illustrates Mullin’s ideas. However, I will argue that through the use of images as a form of language, Lemire offers an insight that is unique to the medium of the graphic novel. Lemire as an artist negotiates the optical physical surfaces and uses these surfaces as a language to bridge the gap between the child and the adult and help us understand the mind of children as autonomous agents. This is an important contribution since it will allow us to understand how children can demonstrate autonomy in some of the ways in which they conduct their lives and how this may be reason enough to grant them a voice when decisions that would affect their lives are made on their behalf, such as custody cases or end of life decisions. (shrink)

Using examples of observations of primates in the wild, I will focus in this chapter on the ways in which some of the main feminist critiques are applicable to the observation of non-human animals. In particular, I will focus on the relationship between primatology and various conceptions of human nature and on the fact that primatology has often been described as a “feminist science.” I argue that in primatology there is an openness to a diversity of approaches and to feminist (...) values that has made it possible for researchers to understand primates in new, more complex ways. Finally, I include a brief discussion of an avenue of future research that will show that even the feminist perspectives explored in this chapter are situated within a specific western background and that it is important to remember that this feminist perspective is just one among many different perspectives. To illustrate variations in the roles that feminist critiques can play in animal observation, I will use examples from my own personal experience of Latinx identity while conducting research in Gombe National Park (Tanzania, Africa). (shrink)

In this paper, I look into personal and political entanglements in Rosa Luxemburg's letters and essays revolving around questions and problems of the revolution. The analysis is informed by Hannah Arendt's theorisation of revolutions in modernity, as well as her reading of narratives within the political. What is intriguing about the Luxemburg/ Arendt encounter is the fact that although both theorists consciously refused to connect themselves with feminist ideas and movements of their times and geographies, their writings have inspired a (...) rich body of feminist theorisations of the political. What I argue is that Luxemburg's ideas and lived experiences of the revolution largely inspired Arendt's theorisation of the revolution as a political phenomenon in the pursuit of freedom, and are opening up new vistas in our understanding of gendered dynamics in historical and contemporary revolutionary events. (shrink)

In this article, I trace lines of materialist pedagogies in the history of women workers’ education following feminist interpretations of Spinoza’s assemblage of joyful affects. More particularly, I focus on the notions of laetitia [joy], gaudium [gladness] and hilaritas [cheerfulness] as entanglements of joy and trace their expression in practices and discourses inscribed in archival documents that I have reassembled around the theme of women workers’ education. My reading of Ethics follows a range of feminist thinkers that have engaged with (...) Spinoza’s ‘ethics of joy’ in education and beyond. The article draws on extensive archival work with personal auto/biographical documents and public essays of women workers/educators/writers in Paris and New York that span the period between 1830 and 1950. What I argue is that it is the experience of creative and radical education that has created a platform for workers to re-imagine themselves in the world with others. (shrink)

This article presents the criteria and measurement tools employed when assessing quality of life for children and adolescents. The notion of ‘quality of life’ is dynamic, in that quality of life changes as a function of age, stage of development, level of reflection, the undertaking of new tasks, and the adoption of new roles. How we assess the subjective quality of life of children and adolescents depends on the level of development and quality-of-life criteria specific to a given period. For (...) younger children, the fulfilment of basic needs - i.e. emotional needs, such as the need to feel safe or valued by others - is especially relevant. For older children, family and health are important, but so are peer-acceptance and school achievements. For adolescents, personal considerations such as the sense of self, autonomy, interpersonal relationships, having friends, possibilities of development and prospects for the future, are all important. It is possible to measure quality of life even in small children, but doing so requires that we pay attention to the specifics of their development, the scope of their personal experiences, and their ability to express their assessments. Hence an approach that makes use of an attractive format is to be preferred. Knowledge of the specific quality-of-life criteria involved enables researchers to construct adequate tools, and to use their results to help bring about improvements in quality of life and the promotion of healthy living. (shrink)

The feminist critical deconstruction of Western culture and theology written by Luce Irigaray could be said to represent a certain branch of ecofeminist perspectives on religion. The article analyses the symbolic structures of suppression of women, body and nature and the exaltation of spirit, culture and the androcentric God, inherent in four hymns included in the new supplement to the book of hymns in the Lutheran Church of Sweden. The analysis shows that these symbolic structures are visible also in these (...) more recent hymns, even though they can be said to also consider and bring out women's experiences. Despite their `feminist' approach, they have not, on any deeper level, affected the subordination of women and the nature-given. (shrink)

The paper discusses the new ‘Croesus’s dedication’ from Thebes. It argues that we should read this inscription independently from Herodotus text, and, thus, suggests a different restoration for lines 4–5 based on contemporary epigraphic forms. The article also examines why the shield of Croesus can cause marvel. It situates the epigram in the context of traditions about Croesus’s dedications in general, as well as traditions about other powerful objects. The power of the shield that Croesus has dedicated is not, I (...) argue, that of a talismanic object, in the sense that its viewing has the power to affect the attitudes of the worshippers. Such traditions seem to be late in Greek culture. The shield of Croesus in the epigram is instrumental in confirming the power of Apollo Ismenios and making the truthfulness of his oracle manifest. (shrink)

In my article I reconstruct the main threads of Robert Stalnaker’s book Our Knowledge of the Internal World, which focuses on the problem of our epistemic relation to our experience and the relation between experience and knowledge. First, the book proposes an interesting view of externalism, which combines classical externalist claims with a contextualist approach to content ascriptions. The approach accommodates some important internalist intuitions by showing how content ascriptions can be sensitive to the perspective from which a subject perceives (...) the world. Second, Stalnaker proposes a theory of selflocating and phenomenal knowledge, which should be understood in terms of differentiating between real possibilities. The puzzling upshot of this elegant solution is that it commits one to the existence of possibilities accessible only from the first-person perspective. Finally, Stalnaker presents an argument which shows that our knowledge about our phenomenal experience is no more direct than the knowledge about external objects. Stalnaker’s claim that by merely having an experience we don’t learn any new information seems, however, too strict in light of his contextualist approach to content ascriptions. (shrink)

This article offers a new interpretation of Mexico's transition to democracy that differs from the pessimistic and less culturally oriented ones that currently prevail. In the article I develop a normative model, which emphasizes the moral capacities of civil societies and their ability to inspire altruistic actions. I suggest that this approach is not only more compelling philosophically but also more plausible empirically. To demonstrate this, I reconstruct a series of events from Mexico's recent past. My discussion suggests that social (...) actors can reconfigure societal self-understandings through moral interventions in the public sphere and that such refigurations of the symbolic order are central for democratic transition. (shrink)

The Anatoly Bakushinsky’s Seminarium (1917–1926) at the Tsvetkov gallery in Moscow became one of the first experimental and most influential venues to develop approaches to the perception of art in Soviet Russia. In it, Bakushinsky, an art critic and the head of the Physical-Psychological Department of the State Academy of Artistic Sciences (GAKhN), incorporated the practice of formal art history into a methodology based on materialism, psychology, and experimental aesthetics widely practiced at the GAKhN. Today, this combination of approaches is (...) perceived as an isolated historical example of an outmoded eclecticism. I argue, however, that Bakushinsky’s methodology should be studied in the context of the complex institutional structure of the Academy that was designed to ensure multidisciplinary work in art studies and its almost immediate implementation into art practice. This institutional and material nexus of the GAKhN’s history opens up a new direction in studying the intellectual legacy of Soviet humanities of the 1920s, which is otherwise often reduced to biographical narratives. (shrink)

Information medicine is a new application and development of an age-old method of healing. It re-creates and re-discovers a method that has proved its merits for thousands of years through a synthesis with new developments in new-paradigm physics and biology. The basic premise of information medicine is the use of information to correct faulty or blocked information-flows in the organism. As the latest discoveries, among others by Dr. Biava, show, even cancerous cells can be reprogrammed through the introduction of substances (...) that provide the correct information. Also, electromagnetic information can produce corrective re-programming, introducing an era of soft, information-based healing not as a substitute for, but as a complement to, the current biochemical substance and physical intervention-based methods. The information-based method I have developed is the one created by the Austrian scientist Erich Koerbler, called New Homeopathy. It harmonizes the electromagnetic field in the body through the use o... (shrink)

This article addresses the issue of social conflict from the epistemology of “deep disagreements”. Unlike other types of disagreements, deep ones generate incommensurability and cannot be corrected through rational argumentation, precisely because it can amplify the disagreement and exacerbate the problem. At the base of these divergences lie two irreconcilable epistemological positions: infallibilism and fallibilism. The infallibilist style of argumentation is embodied in attempts to find objective truth through final and conclusive evidence. Such a position induces them to defend their (...) own beliefs through vicious cycles that Carlos Pereda has called "argumentative vertigos", generating different silencing and devaluation strategies based on identity prejudices. Dizzying argumentation can even lead to an epistemic annihilation of the Other as a valid interlocutor. This phenomenon is presented as "epistemicide". In this work, the analysis of the frictions, tensions and disputes that can be activated in the course of the production and validation of knowledge is taken further, to probe the conditions under which devaluation and annihilation may be perpetrated. against himself. I call this phenomenon “autoepistemicide”, and I draw a comparison between this concept and its concomitant in the clinical setting: that of “Gaslighting”. Finally, I extract the most important reflections of the article, opening new horizons for future research. (shrink)

This article deals with the English translations of the adverb oikeiôs in Aristotle's texts. In chapter 7 of the Categories, Aristotle advises speakers to create words if necessary, on the condition that the new word is given oikeiôs. However, the English translations does not render in an accurate way what Aristotle wants to express regarding name-giving, since the adverb oikeiôs, deriving from the adjective oikeios, denotes 'property' and 'familiarity', the second meaning obviously originating from the first. Oikeiôs is crucial for (...) us to comprehend Aristotle's concept of name-giving, since he combines it with forms of the verbs apodidômi or legô, more than eight times in this particular chapter, where he is concerned with correct linguistic rendition. In sense of 'familiarity', oikeiôs sheds more light on the philosopher's semantic theory in On Interpretation, helping us to understand exactly how Aristotle conceived of conventionality, i.e., combined with familiarity. (shrink)

In this article, I reviewed the passage of the Prodigal Son in the context of the Lukan perspective and the reader then, is referred to Luke 15: 11-31. This parable gives us an image of a loving and forgiving God whose mercy endures forever. This is the greatest love story which presents the depths of God’s love. Several biblical scholars disclose that this parable guides us to new hope by allowing God to love, forgive us and accept his saving love.

Using Leventhal’s (Social exchange: Advances in theory and research, Plenum Press, New York, 1980 ) rules of procedural justice as well as deontic justice (Folger in Research in social issues in management, Information Age, Greenwich, CT, 2001 ), we examine how personal value for diversity moderates the negative relationship between perceived discrimination against minorities (i.e., racial minorities and females) at work and the perceived procedural justice of minorities’ treatment by the organization. Through a field survey of 190 employees, we found (...) that observers high in personal value for diversity have stronger negative reactions to the mistreatment of women and racial minorities than observers low in personal value for diversity. These findings support and extend the deontic justice perspective because those who personally value diversity had the strongest negative reactions toward the discriminatory treatment of minorities. (shrink)